By Chsomo Phiri
Director of the Department of Climate Change and Meteorological Services (DCCMS), Lucy Mtilatila, yesterday told the Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee investigating the Chikangawa plane crash that claimed the lives of former vice-president Saulos Chilima and eight others that her department had not identified any severe weather threat to pose a danger to the aircraft when it departed from Lilongwe to Mzuzu on June 10, 2024.
Appearing before the committee at parliament building in Lilongwe,Mtilatila said the department issues weather warnings when it anticipates significant conditions such as atmospheric instability, thunderstorms, lightning and strong winds, but no such warning was issued for June 10, 2024 because those conditions were not expected.
She said DCCMS has procedures for VVIP flights under which a weather forecaster is deployed to both the airport of origin and destination when details of the flight are provided in advance.
“If we knew about this flight in advance, we would have deployed an aviation meteorological forecaster from KIA to Mzuzu to support the ope
Mtilatila explained that Mzuzu Airport did not have a permanently stationed forecaster because it was not handling frequent commercial flights at the time,” said Mtilatila.
Instead, she said weather observers were stationed there to collect data, while aviation meteorologists were based at Kamuzu International Airport (KIA) in Lilongwe and Chileka Airport in Bkanty.
She said the department needs flight information sufficiently in advance, normally at least three hours before departure, to prepare weather documentation and provide a briefing tailored to the flight.
The DCCMS chief said the weather information normally covers conditions at the departure airport, along the route and at the destination, including factors such as wind and cloud conditions.
She however, said the department did not provide the en-route weather information specifically for the Chilima flight because it was not aware that the flight was taking place.
“Of course, it was not provided because it was not requested,” she said when asked why the flight crew did not receive the relevant en-route weather report.
Committee chairperson Walter Nyamilandu Manda questioned Mtilatila on why the department had not provided en-route weather information for the flight.
Mtilatila maintained that DCCMS could not prepare a specific flight briefing because it had not been informed about the operation.
She said:”In short, we were not aware, and that is why we did not provide it.Otherwise, on that day, all the flights that were leaving KIA received the documentation.”
Mtilatila added that, although she was outside Malawi when the accident occurred, she later followed the matter because aviation accident investigations require the department to review its meteorological records and procedures.
She said DCCMS immediately engaged officials at Mzuzu Airport and KIA to preserve the relevant information pending the investigation.
She told the committee that meteorological records covering the period from the aircraft’s departure from Lilongwe until its intended arrival in Mzuzu should be available, although she did not have the records with her at the time of giving evidence.
Mtilatila also explained that aviation weather reports primarily focus on conditions relevant to aircraft operating at flight levels, including clouds and wind, rather than fog, which occurs near the ground.
She however, said that fog can be included in a weather report when it is expected at the destination and is considered relevant to the flight.
“The department provides weather information before an aircraft departs. The information mainly covers clouds and wind, rather than fog, because fog occurs near the ground,” said Mtilatila.
She told the committee that weather conditions can change rapidly and that, where visibility deteriorates significantly, airport personnel should consult meteorological officers so that the information can be verified and appropriate aviation weather information issued.
Responding to questions about whether an aerodrome information officer or air traffic controller could independently provide weather information to pilots, Mtilatila said such officers should rely on information provided by meteorological personnel rather than conduct their own meteorological assessments.
She said their role is primarily to communicate weather information, while meteorological officers are responsible for analysing and validating it.
Mtilatila was also questioned about reports that visibility at Mzuzu had fallen to about five kilometres before the aircraft’s arrival.
She said such a change should be communicated to the meteorological officer, who can then verify the visibility and determine whether an appropriate aviation weather warning or other information needed to be issued.
Asked whether an air traffic controller can disregard a meteorological report and issue information based on personal observation, Mtilatila said aviation personnel are trained and technically competent, but significant changes in conditions should be referred to meteorological officers for assessment.
The committee also questioned Mtilatila on whether DCCMS can detect deteriorating weather conditions after an aircraft has already departed and alert the crew.
She said the department’s standard pre-departure weather briefing is prepared before take-off and is not a substitute for in-flight weather information once an aircraft is airborne.
Mtilatila further told the committee that, on the day of the accident, fog and cloud were reported at a similar level of about 600 feet, describing the two conditions as effectively overlapping at that level.
Asked whether it can be accurate to say the cloud and fog has met, she agreed that such an explanation can be used for ease of understanding.
The committee also sought clarification on how DCCMS receives information about VVIP flights.
Mtilatila said there is no clearly formalised protocol specifying who must notify the department about every VVIP or VIP flight.
She said DCCMS is usually informed through the civil aviation authorities, after which it prepares the necessary meteorological information.
She said this gap demonstrated the need to formalise notification procedures for VIP and VVIP flights.
Mtilatila recommended that the procedures clearly identify the officer responsible for notifying DCCMS, specify the minimum meteorological information required before a flight and outline the consequences of failing to comply.
She also called for the introduction of a mandatory pre-departure checklist requiring confirmation that the latest weather forecast has been obtained, assessed and communicated to the flight crew before a VIP or VVIP flight is cleared for departure.
According to Mtilatila, flight-clearance procedures should also be strengthened to ensure that no VIP or VVIP flight departs without confirmation that the necessary meteorological information has been obtained and properly assessed.
She further recommended that VIP and VVIP flights be operated from airports equipped with adequate facilities, equipment and services to support safe aviation operations, including meteorological, communication, navigation and air traffic services.
